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Abstract 
Linkages between foreign aid, terrorism and natural resource (fuel and iron ore) exports are 
investigated in this study. The focus is on 78 developing countries with data for the period 
1984 to 2008. The generalised method of moment is employed as empirical strategy. Three 
main foreign aid variables are used for the analysis, namely: bilateral aid, multilateral aid and 
total aid. The corresponding terrorism variables employed are: domestic terrorism, 
transnational terrorism, unclear terrorism and total terrorism. The following findings are 
established. First, the criteria informing the validity of specifications corresponding to iron 
ore exports do not hold. Second, there is evidence of convergence in fuel exports. Third, 
whereas the unconditional impacts of aid dynamics are not significant, the unconditional 
impacts of terrorism dynamics are consistently positive on fuel exports. Fourth, the interaction 
between terrorism and aid dynamics consistently display negative signs, with corresponding 
modifying aid thresholds within respective ranges. Unexpected signs are elicited and policy 
implications discussed. Given the unexpected results, an extended analysis is performed in 
which net effects are computed. These net effects are constitutive of the unconditional effect 
from terrorism and the conditional impacts from the interaction between foreign aid and 
terrorism dynamics. Based on the extended analysis, bilateral aid and total aid modulate 
terrorism dynamics to induce net positive effects on fuel exports while multilateral aid 
moderates terrorism dynamics to engender negative net effects on fuel exports. The research 
improves extant knowledge on nexuses between resources, terrorism and foreign aid. 
   
JEL Classification:  F40; F23; F35; Q34; O40  
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1. Introduction 
The 2015 report on the Global Peace Index (GPI) has shown that approximately thirteen per 
cent of the world’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is wasted on expenditures linked to 
violence (Asongu and Kodila-Tedika 2017a, Anderson 2015).  In essence about 14.3 trillion 
USD corresponding to 13.4% of the world’s GDP in 2014 was used to curtail policy 
syndromes such as violent crime and political strife. The underlying expenditure represents 
the combined annual wealth or GDP of some major countries, namely: Spain, Canada, France, 
Brazil, Germany and the United Kingdom. According to the report, most of the documented 
violence is terrorism-oriented. Moreover, the positive trend is expected to grow in the near 
future. This is essentially because terrorism networks have been expanding significantly with 
respect to their scopes of operation, representing approximately 61% more killings in 2014 
from a 2008 base year. It is important to note that a significant proportion of terrorists’ 
activities are traceable to developing countries. Moreover, corresponding externalities of 
poverty have also been growing substantially, particularly because since World War 2, 2014 
is the year that registered the record number of internally displaced persons1. 
 Against the above background, a significant bulk of the literature has been devoted to 
understanding the channels by which crimes, conflicts, terrorism and political strife can be 
mitigated (Asongu and Kodila-Tedika 2017a). To this end, a plethora of instruments have 
been documented, notably: Bell et al. (2014) articulate the relevance of transparency while 
Choi (2010) is concerned with the policy channel of the rule of law. Brockhoff et al. (2015) 
provide insights into education instruments, which is consistent with the perspective of Costa 
et al. (2008) and Asongu and Nwachukwu (2016a) who have respectively focused on 
bilingualism and lifelong learning. Hoffman et al. (2013) is concerned with freedom of the 
press and publicity whereas Asongu and Kodila-Tedika (2016) conclude that corruption-
control is the most relevant weapon in the fight against conflicts/crimes. Gardner (2007) and 
Feridun and Shahbaz (2010) respectively focus on behavrioural factors and military power.  
Asongu and Nwachukwu (2016b) analyse the relevance of harmonizing policy in the 
prevention of tensions of socio-political nature that fuelled the 2011 Arab Spring while a 
more contemporary strand of literature has been concerned with governance, military 
expenditure and inclusive mechanisms by which terrorism can be curtailed (Asongu and 
                                                          
1
 It should be noted that, the mid-April 2015 publication of a report by the World Bank pertaining to World 
Development Indicators showed that most developing countries did not achieve the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) extreme poverty target (Caulderwood 2015, World Bank 2015, Asongu and Kodila-Tedika 
2017b).  
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Nwachukwu 2016b; Asongu et al. 2017; Asongu and Nwachukwu 2018; Asongu et al. 2018a; 
Asongu et al. 2018b, 2018c).   
 Another strand of the literature has been oriented towards nexuses between violence, 
political instability, terrorism and macroeconomic outcomes. Abadie and Gardeazabal (2008) 
have investigated the effect of terrorism on external flows within the framework of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) while Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014) are concerned with the relevance 
of development assistance in moderating the impact of terrorism on FDI: an analysis which is 
extended by Efobi et al. (2018) and Asongu et al. (2015) with respectively, contingencies on 
corruption-control and existing levels of FDI. Gries et al. (2011), Shahbaz et al. (2013) and  
Shahzad et al. (2016) have provided evidence of bi-directional causality between terrorism 
and economic growth, while Piazza (2006)  and Choi, (2015) conclude that the causality 
direction is from economic growth to terrorism.  Conversely, according to  Gaibulloev and  
Sandler (2009),  Öcal and Yildirim   (2010) and  Meierrieks and Gries  (2013), the underlying 
causality runs from terrorism to economic growth. Koh (2007) focus on the nexus between 
innovation and terrorism whereas Humphreys (2005) is concerned with how natural resources 
interplay with terrorism. This research complements that attendant literature by focusing on 
how foreign aid can be used to modulate the potentially unfavourable effect of terrorism on 
exports of two natural resources, namely: iron ore and fuel.  
 Following Asongu and Kodila-Tedika (2017a), documented studies pertaining to the 
terrorism-trade relationship can be engaged along three main strands, namely: the effect of 
terrorism on trade, causality from trade to terrorism and concerns arising from modelling the 
underlying nexus. First, with regard to the effect of terrorism on trade: post-9/112 security 
measures, put in place to mitigate the negative incidence of terrorism on world trade have 
been documented by Richardson (2004). The relevance of welfare and terrorism is assessed 
by Nitsch and Schumacher (2004) from 1960 to1993 in 200 countries by means of an 
augmented gravity model.  Employing a multitude of indicators on violence, terrorism and 
bilateral trade, they have concluded that terrorism reduces trade openness. The findings show 
that doubling terrorism incidents reduces bilateral trade by approximately 4%. (3) The 
interplay between closeness to the origin of terrorism and corresponding negative spillovers 
on trade openness has been investigated by De Sousa et al. (2009a) to establish the following: 
(i) the need for a theory that clarifies the nexuses between policies of security, trade and 
transnational terrorism to be carefully worked-out; (ii) imperative for more robust 
                                                          
2
 9/11 refers to the September 11th 2001 terrorists attacks in the United States of America (USA).  
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examinations of terrorism externalities pertaining to neighbouring relationships and incidents. 
De Sousa et al. (2009b) have extended the analysis by assessing the effect of the diffusions of 
terrorism at the international level on trade and security outcomes. The empirical model is 
motivated by the assumption that nearness to the origin of terrorism bears a significant nexus 
with the corresponding externalities of terrorism.  The basic idea underpinning the study is 
that, indicators of security which negatively affect trade influence the country from which 
terrorism originates and neighbouring countries simultaneously. On the contrary, countries 
located much further from the country which is the source of terror could positively benefit 
from trade openness by getting some compensation for the loss in trade by countries close to 
the origin of terror. The corresponding results show: (i) a direct negative incidence on 
international trade from transnational terrorism; (ii) an indirect unfavourable effect from 
terrorism to neighbouring countries of the source of terror and (iii) trade increases with 
remoteness of terrorism.  
 Second, with regard to the role of trade openness on terrorism, the sparse literature on 
the relationship has substantially been oriented towards the commercialisation of illegal 
commodities. (1) Based on the controversial underpinning that terrorism is fuelled by ‘illicit 
drugs’ trade, Piazza (2011) has investigated the nexuses surrounding drugs trade and terrorism 
dynamics to reach the conclusion that domestic and international terrorism are substantially 
fuelled by cocaine production, the commercialisation of opiate and cultivation of illicit drugs.  
Conversely, crop eradication and the ban of drugs have effects that are opposite. Piazza 
(2011) further extends the findings by assessing the nexus between terrorism and ‘opium 
trade’ in Afghanistan, employing binomial regressions and focusing on 24 Afghan provinces 
using data for the period 1996-2008. The author establishes that provinces with substantial 
opium production are equally associated with high incidences of attacks and causalities. 
Hence, the direction of causality is concluded to be flowing from the production of opium to 
terror incidents.  
 The third strand on the modelling issues has been clearly documented by Mirza and 
Verdier (2008) from a survey of the literature. They conclude by presenting four main pitfalls 
from empirical studies pertaining to the nexus between terrorism and trade openness, notably, 
the imperative of: (a) accounting for omitted variables which are obviously linked to terrorism 
and trade; (b) acknowledging that terrorism is persistent over time; (c) distinguishing between 
the impacts of incidental country-specific cases from the effect of occurrences that relate to 
the source-country and (d) accounting for endogeneity.  
6 
 
 Noticeably, the engaged literature can be improved from at least four main 
perspectives, namely, the need to: (i) take on board more dimensions of terrorism, (ii) explore 
the interplay of a foreign policy variable in the nexus between trade openness and terrorism, 
(iii) engage trade-specific elements in the relationship and (iv) adopt a modelling approach 
that accounts for endogeneity.  First, there is a caution from Choi (2015) on the importance of 
engaging a multitude of indicators when examining interactions between factors of terrorism 
and macroeconomic outcomes. Consistent with this literature, a stream of recent studies has 
considered a multitude of terrorism variables, namely: dynamics of domestic, unclear, 
transnational and total terrorism (Efobi et al. 2015, Asongu et al. 2015, Asongu and Kodila-
Tedika 2017a). Therefore, this research follows this stream of studies in adopting the 
underlying terrorism dynamics. Hence, this study departs from the attendant terrorism-trade 
studies that have focused exclusively on either transnational or domestic terrorism (De Sousa 
et al.  2009a, 2009b;  Piazza 2011). 
Second, in an effort to improve room for policy implications, we are consistent with a 
stream of the research that has used development assistance as a moderator of the incidence of 
terrorism on macroeconomic variables (Bandyopadhyay et al. 2014, Efobi et al. 2015). 
Therefore, this research departs from the discussed trade-terrorism studies by engaging an 
interactive indicator of foreign aid as a policy variable. In addition, motivated by the 
recommendation of Choi (2015) on the relevance of taking more policy variables on board, 
this research uses three foreign aid variables, namely: bilateral aid, multilateral aid and total 
aid. Consistent with the established exploratory insights from Richardson (2014) and 
empirical constructs from De Sousa et al. (2009a, 2009b) which support the evidence that 
terrorism mitigates trade openness; the intuition for assessing if foreign aid can dampen the 
hypothetically negative terrorism-trade relationship is sound.  
Third, it is important to lay emphasis on specific trade commodities. Hence, contrary 
to the bulk of engaged literature above and more recently Asongu and Kodila-Tedika (2017a), 
we narrow the perspective from the broad measurement of trade to natural resource exports, 
notably: iron ore and fuel exports. Emphasis on natural resources builds on the fundamental 
role of natural resources in driving economic prosperity in developing countries over the past 
decaded (Amavilah 2015). Hence, by employing specific export indicators, we are consistent 
with Piazza (2011, 2012) and not in accordance with Nitsch and Schumacher (2004), 
Richardson (2004) and De Sousa et al. (2009a, 2009b).  
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Fourth, Mirza and Verdier (2008) in a survey have cautioned that empirical studies 
should take the concern of endogeneity into account when assessing interactions between 
dynamics of terrorism and macroeconomic outcomes. In the light of the underpinning caution, 
this research models the interaction with the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) which 
accounts for endogeneity from a multitude of fronts, notably by: controlling for simultaneity 
using internal instruments and accounting for the unobserved heterogeneity through time-
invariant omitted variables (Love and Zicchino 2006, Baltagi 2008, Roodman 2009a, 2009b, 
Asongu and Kodila-Tedika 2017a, Tchamyou et al. 2019).  
Knowledgeable of the above background, the present study focuses on investigating if 
and how development assistance can mitigate the potentially unfavourable incidence of 
terrorism on the export of natural resources. The temporal and geographical scopes are 
respectively, 1984 to 2008 and 78 developing countries.  The focus of the research on the 
underlying periodicity and developing countries builds on three main motivations. First, as 
maintained by Gaibulloev and Sandler (2009), the unappealing macroeconomic impacts from 
terrorism are comparatively more apparent in developing countries vis-à-vis their developed 
counterparts because the former countries are lacking in logistical, financial and technological 
capacities. These capacities are essential in the absorption of the negative externalities 
associated with terrorists’ activities. Second, development assistance flows to developing 
countries from developed countries. Hence, the objective of employing a foreign aid policy 
variable is consistent with an analytical scope of developing nations. Third, this research is 
also motivated by the need to compare the findings of this study with those that have engaged 
the same dataset and for the same periodicity, notably: Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014), Asongu 
et al. (2015) and Efobi et al. (2018). As emphasised above, the underlying comparative 
studies have focused on investigating how development assistance can be relevant in hedging 
the potentially unfavourable incidence of terrorism on FDI.  
 Consistent with the underlying literature which has focused on associations between 
terrorism and macroeconomic outcomes (Asongu et al. 2015, Asongu and Kodila-Tedika 
2017a, Efobi et al. 2018), the theoretical underpinnings underlying the interaction between 
terrorism and macroeconomic outcomes build on the  Conflict Management Model (CMM) of 
Thomas-Kilmann (1992) and the Social Control Theory (SCT) from Black (1990). 
Accordingly, the documented theoretical underpinnings by Akinwale (2010: 125) are also in 
line with research on conflict management (Borg 1992, Volkema and Bergmann 1995). These 
theoretical postulations are relevant to this research in the perspective that the moderating 
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proxy of foreign aid can be used to maintain an environment that is conducive to the hedging 
of terrorism. Accordingly, government expenditure needed for the fight terrorism is boosted 
by foreign aid (Gaibulloev and Sandler 2009) and development assistance can also be vital in 
increasing consolidating channels that have documented to limite the unfavourable incidences 
of political strife and terrorism, notably, the rule of law and education (Heyneman 2002, Beets 
2005, Heyneman 2008a, 2008b, Oreopoulos and Salvanes 2009, Asongu and Nwachukwu 
2016a).  
 The remainder of the research is organised in the following manner. The introduction 
is followed by a Data and Methodology section which clarifies the geographical and temporal 
scopes of the study as well as the empirical strategy employed to assess the importance of 
foreign aid in moderating the incidence of terrorism on trade openness. The Empirical results 
section discloses the findings while the research concludes in the last section with 
implications and further research directions. 
  
2. Data and Methodology 
2.1 Data  
 Building on the motivation of this study, the geographical and temporal scopes of the 
research are respectively 78 developing nations and 1984 to 2008. The justifications for these 
scopes have already been discussed in the preceding section. Moreover, in order to avoid the 
influence of outliers, not all developing countries are involved in the sample. Accordingly, 
following Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014) and Efobi et al. (2018), Palestine, Western Gaza, Iraq 
and Afghanistan are not involved in the sample3. The corresponding data is made up of three 
year non-overlapping intervals. The purpose of involving data averages is primarily to reduce 
short term disturbances that may considerably loom.  
 The two outcome variables employed in the research are fuel and iron ore exports 
while four terrorism proxies are used, namely: dynamics of domestic, unclear, transnational 
and total terrorism (Asongu and Kodila-Tedika 2017a). The corresponding three foreign aid 
                                                          
3
 The adopted countries include: Albania, Costa Rica, India, Namibia, Syria, Algeria, Cote d’Ivoire, Indonesia, 
Nicaragua, Tanzania, Angola, Dominican Republic, Iran, Niger, Thailand, Argentina, Ecuador, Jamaica, Nigeria, 
Togo, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, Trinidad and Tobago, Bangladesh,  El Salvador, Kenya, Panama, 
Tunisia, Bolivia, Ethiopia, Lebanon, Papua New Guinea, Turkey, Botswana, Gabon, Libya, Paraguay, Uganda, 
Brazil, Gambia, Madagascar, Peru, Uruguay, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Malawi, Philippines, Venezuela, Cameroon, 
Guatemala, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, Chile, Guinea, Mali, Senegal, Yemen, China, Guinea-Bissau, 
Malta, Sierra Leone, Zambia, Colombia, Guyana ,Mexico, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Congo, D. Republic, Haiti, 
Morocco, Sri Lanka, Congo Republic, Honduras, Mozambique and Sudan. 
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indicators are: multilateral aid, bilateral aid and total aid. The adopted elements in the 
conditioning information set are: internal conflicts, political globalisation, inflation, 
infrastructure, exchange rate and trade openness. The choice of these indicators in the 
conditioning information set is motivated by contemporary terrorism literature 
(Bandyopadhyay et al. 2014,  Efobi and Asongu 2016, Asongu and Biekpe 2018, Asongu and 
Amankwah-Amoah 2018).  It is expected that trade openness, better infrastructure and 
improvements in exchange rate will have a positive incidence on the exports of resources 
(Akpan 2014, Asongu 2015a). Coversely, civil/internal conflicts and growing prices or 
inflation should engender opposite incidences on the outcome variables. In essence, Rodrik 
(2008) documents that a high rate of exchange stimulate exports.  Furthermore, chaotic 
inflation is likely to diminish the volume of trade given that it is associated with more 
uncertainty in economic activities. In essence, as recently documented by Kelsey and le Roux 
(2017, 2018), investors prefer engaging with macroeconomic environments that are 
characterised with reduced ambiguity. It is difficult to establish the expected incidence of 
political globalisation because its impact is substantially contingent on some influence in 
‘decision making’ at the international level (Asongu 2014a). We provide definitions for the 
discussed variables in Table 1. Accordingly, in order to address concerns pertaining to the 
positive skew of the terrorism data, the terrorism indicators are log-normalized in accordance 
with contemporary literature (Bandyopadhyay et al. 2014,  Efobi and Asongu 2016, Asongu 
and Biekpe 2018, Asongu and Amankwah-Amoah 2018).  
In the apparent from Table 2 which discloses the summary statistics that, from the 
perspective of mean values, the engaged variables can be compared. Moreover, in the light of 
corresponding standard deviations, the research can be confident that significant estimated 
coefficients will be derived from the empirical analysis. The correlation matrix in Table 3 is 
designed to tackle issues pertaining to multicollinearity in the independent variables of 
interest. The resulting concerns in foreign aid variables are addressed by employing the 
foreign aid dynamics in distinct specifications.  
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Table 1: Definitions and sources of variables 
    
Variables Signs Definitions Sources 
    
Fuel Export  FuelExp Ln. Fuel Export (as a % of Merchandise Export)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bandyopadhyay 
et al. (2014) 
and Efobi et al. 
(2015) 
   
Iron Ore Export IOExp Ln. Iron Ore Export (as a % of Merchandise Export) 
   
Trade Openness  LnTrade Ln. of Exports plus Imports of Commodities (% of GDP) 
   
Infrastructure  LnTel  Ln. of Number of Telephone lines (per 100 people) 
   
Inflation  LnInflation Ln. of Consumer Price Index (% of annual) 
   
Exchange rate LnXrate  Ln. of  Exchange rate (local currency per USD) 
   
Bilateral Aid  LnBilaid Ln. of Bilateral aid, net disbursement (million USD) 
   
Multilateral Aid  LnMulaid Ln. of Multilateral aid, net disbursement (million USD) 
   
Total Aid  LnTotaid Ln. of Total aid, net disbursement (million USD) 
   
Domestic terrorism Domter Number of Domestic terrorism incidents 
   
Transnational 
terrorism 
Tranater Number of Transnational terrorism incidents 
 
   
Unclear terrorism  Unclter Number of terrorism incidents whose category in unclear 
   
Total terrorism  Totter Total number of terrorism incidents  
   
Political 
globalisation 
LnPolglob  Ln. of  Index of political globalisation  
   
Internal conflicts  Civcon Index of  internal civil conflicts  
    
GDP: Gross Domestic Product. WDI: World Development Indicators.  
 
Table 2: Summary statistics  
      
 Mean S.D Minimum Maximum Obs 
      
Fuel Export (ln) 1.007 2.785 -11.366 4.585 503 
      
Iron Ore Export (ln) 0.698 2.120 -10.495 4.486 511 
      
Trade Openness (ln) 4.118 0.534 2.519 5.546 612 
      
Infrastructure (ln) 1.475 1.017 0.091 4.031 616 
      
Inflation (ln) 2.414 1.384 -3.434 9.136 581 
      
Exchange rate (ln) 2.908 3.870 -22.121 21.529 618 
      
Bilateral Aid (ln) 5.181 1.286 0.765 8.362 602 
      
Multilateral Aid (ln) 4.163 1.518 -1.249 7.105 600 
      
Total Aid (ln) 5.550 1.276 0.800 8.495 608 
      
Domestic terrorism 14.292 45.179 0 419.33 624 
      
Transnational terrorism 2.316 6.127 0 63 624 
      
Unclear terrorism 1.972 7.479 0 86 624 
      
Total terrorism 18.581 55.595 0 477.66 624 
      
Political globalisation (ln) 4.036 0.301 2.861 4.530 624 
      
Internal conflicts 0.965 1.906 0 10 615 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation. Obs: Observations. 
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Table 3: Correlation Matrix 
                
LnFuelExp LnIOExp LnTrade LnTel LnInflation LnXrate LnBilad LnMulaid LnTotaid Domter Tranater Unclter Totter LnPolglob Civcon  
1.000 -0.067 -0.106 0.095 0.016 -0.002 0.230 -0.090 -0.007 0.044 0.066 0.013 0.044 0.207 0.043 LnFuelExp 
 1.000 0.103 0.080 -0.001 -0.055 0.126 0.025 0.093 0.049 0.0007 -0.001 0.040 0.109 -0.079 LnIOExp 
  1.000 0.296 -0.230 0.043 -0.267 -0.289 -0.282 -0.236 -0.206 -0.240 -0.246 -0.122 -0.299 LnTrade 
   1.000 -0.121 -0.191 -0.376 -0.514 -0.450 0.023 0.072 -0.003 0.026 0.268 -0.183 LnTel 
    1.000 -0.284 -0.047 -0.023 -0.039 0.171 0.164 0.091 0.169 -0.150 0.185 LnInflation 
     1.000 0.114 0.183 0.144 -0.081 -0.001 -0.050 -0.073 0.089 -0.120 LnXrate 
      1.000 0.721 0.970 0.116 0.088 0.093 0.117 0.233 0.259 LnBilaid 
       1.000 0.833 0.014 -0.039 0.069 0.016 0.167 0.194 LnMulaid 
        1.000 0.093 0.059 0.094 0.094 0.227 0.255 LnTotaid 
         1.000 0.743 0.733 0.993 0.127 0.428 Domter 
          1.000 0.528 0.785 0.120 0.418 Tranater 
           1.000 0.789 0.072 0.347 Unclter 
            1.000 0.126 0.441 Totter 
             1.000 -0.024 LnPolglob 
              1.000 Civcon 
                
LnFuelExp: Fuel Export.  LnIOExp: Iron Ore Export.  LnTrade: Trade Openness.  LnTel: Number of Telephone lines. LnXrate: Exchange rate.  LnBilaid: Bilateral aid. LnMulaid: Multilateral  
aid.  LnTotaid: Total aid.  Domter: Number of Domestic terrorism incidents.  Tranater: Number of Transnational terrorism incidents. Unclter: Number of terrorism  
incidents whose category in unclear.  Totter: Total number of terrorism incidents.   LnPolglob: Index of political globalisation. Civcon:  Index of internal civil conflicts.   
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2.2 Methodology 
 Following the underpinning terrorism literature motivating the study (Asongu and 
Kodila-Tedika 2017a; Efobi et al. 2018), a two-step GMM empirical strategy is adopted for 
the study. The corresponding GMM approach which is an extension of  Arellano and Bover 
(1995)   by Roodman (2009a, 2009b)  has been established to produce comparatively better 
estimates, relative to less contemporary difference and system GMM approaches that are not 
based on forward orthogonal deviations (Love and Zicchino 2006, Baltagi 2008, Tchamyou 
2019a, 2019b, Asongu and  Nwachukwu 2016c, 2016d). Moreover, there is an option with 
which to limit instrument proliferation when employing the estimation technique (Tchamyou 
and Asongu 2017; Boateng et al. 2018). This endogeneity-robust empirical strategy is in 
accordance with the engaged literature in the introduction because exports have also been 
established to have an incidence on terrorism (Piazza 2011, 2012)4.  
The following equations in levels (1) and first difference (2) summarize the standard 
system GMM estimation procedure.  
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where, tiR ,
 
is either ‘fuel exports’ or ‘iron ore exports’ of country i
 
in  period t ; is a 
constant;
 
 represents the coefficient of autoregression which is one in the study;  F , 
represents Foreign aid; Terrorism is denoted with T ; FT , reflects the interaction between 
Terrorism (T) and Foreign aid (F); the conditioning information set which is represented with 
W  entails the set of control variables  (trade openness, internal conflicts, exchange rate, 
infrastructure, inflation and  political globalisation);
 
i
 
is the country-specific effect, t
 
is 
the time-specific constant  and ti ,  the error term. In the specification, we prefer the two-step 
to the one-step procedure because it is heteroscedasticity-consistent. 
Given that the estimation technique involves interactive variables, it is worthwhile for 
the research to briefly engage some pitfalls documented in Brambor et al. (2006). The authors 
                                                          
4
 In addition, the endogeneity issue is also apparent from political cycles of violence and non-violence in 
political strife (Singh 2001, 2007).  
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recommend that the specifications should involve all constitutive variables in the 
specifications. Moreover, for the estimations to have economic meaning and by extension 
make economic sense, the interactive estimated coefficients should be interpreted in terms of 
conditional or marginal incidences. In essence, the foreign aid or moderating proxy should be 
established within the ranges that are disclosed in the summary statistics.  
The identification strategy is such that the outcome variables are iron ore and fuel 
exports, the strictly exogenous variables are years while the endogenous explaining or 
predetermined variables are the independent variables of interest (i.e. foreign aid and 
terrorism dynamics) and variables in conditioning information set. This identification strategy 
which broadly follows insights from contemporary research (Love and Zicchino 2006, Dewan 
and Ramaprasad 2014, Asongu and De Moor 2017) is also consistent with Roodman (2009b) 
who has posited that years are arguably relevant strictly exogenous variables because they 
cannot be endogenous after a first difference.  
The criterion used to assess the validity of exclusion restrictions is the Difference in 
Hansen Test (DHT) of instrument exogeneity whose null hypothesis should not rejected in 
order for the exclusion restrictions assumption to hold. The corresponding exclusion 
restriction assumption is that the identified strictly exogenous indicators influence the 
outcome indicators exclusively via the mechanisms represented by the endogenous explaining 
variables. This criterion is broadly consistent with less contemporary instrumental variables 
approaches which require that the null hypothesis of the Sargan/Hansen test should not be 
rejected in order for the exclusion restrictions to be valid (Beck et al. 2003, Asongu and  
Nwachukwu 2016e).  
 
3. Empirical results 
3.1 Conditional and unconditional effects 
Tables 4 shows findings on linkages between natural resource exports, bilateral aid and 
terrorism, the focus of Table 5 is on nexuses between natural resource exports, multilateral aid 
and terrorism dynamics while Table 6 completes the presentation of results by providing the 
corresponding findings pertaining to the associations between natural resource exports, total 
aid and terrorism. Each table is characterised by four specifications, which respectively relate 
to domestic terrorism, transnational terrorism, unclear terrorism and total terrorism (in this 
order). Moreover, tables’ in left-hand side (LHS) show “fuel exports”-oriented specifications 
while those in of the right-hand side (RHS) are linked to iron ore exports. In accordance with 
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the underlying comparative literature, four main information criteria are used to examine the 
validity of models5. 
 The following findings are apparent from Table 4. First, the criteria of information 
which is relevant in assessing the validity of models do not consistently hold across 
specifications on the RHS corresponding to the exports of iron ore. This is essentially because 
the AR(2) in difference is significant, implying the presence of second order autocorrelation 
in difference. Second, terrorism consistently increases fuel exports, with the following order 
of increasing relevance in magnitude: total terrorism (0.006), domestic terrorism (0.007), 
transnational terrorism (0.041) and unclear terrorism (0.042). Third, the effect of aid on fuels 
exports is consistently not positively significant. Fourth, the interactions between bilateral aid 
and terrorism consistently display negative marginal effects on fuel exports. Moreover, the 
modifying thresholds for which the effect becomes negative are within the range (0.765 to 
8.362) of bilateral aid provided by the summary statistics, notably: 7.000 (0.007/0.001) for 
domestic terrorism; 2.000 (0.014/0.007) for transnational terrorism; 5.250 (0.042/0.008) for 
unclear terrorism and 6.000 (0.006/0.001) for total terrorism.  Fifth, some evidence of 
convergence is apparent in fuel exports. According to the supporting information criterion, the 
absolute value of the corresponding lagged endogenous variable is between 0 and 16. This 
implies that countries with low fuel exports are catching-up countries with higher levels of 
fuel exports.  
In Table 5, the following conclusions can be drawn. First, consistent with Table 4, the 
relevant information criteria for models’ validity do not consistently hold across specifications 
on the RHS corresponding to iron ore exports, notably because the  second order 
autocorrelation test in difference for the absence of autocorrelation is significant. Second, 
with the exception of unclear terrorism, the effect of terrorism on the dependent variable on 
the LHS is positive, with the following order of increasing relevance in magnitude: total 
terrorism (0.001), domestic terrorism (0.002) and transnational terrorism (0.011). It should be 
                                                          
5
 “First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR (2)) in difference for the absence of 
autocorrelation in the residuals should not be rejected. Second the Sargan and Hansen over-identification restrictions (OIR) tests should not 
be significant because their null hypotheses are the positions that instruments are valid or not correlated with the error terms. In essence, 
while the Sargan OIR test is not robust but not weakened by instruments, the Hansen OIR is robust but weakened by instruments. In order to 
restrict identification or limit the proliferation of instruments, we have ensured that instruments are lower than the number of cross-sections 
in most specifications. Third, the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for exogeneity of instruments is also employed to assess the validity of 
results from the Hansen OIR test. Fourth, a Fischer test for the joint validity of estimated coefficients is also provided” (Asongu& De Moor, 
2017, p.200). 
6
 We do not elaborate on the criterion of convergence for brevity, lack of space and interest of remaining 
consistent with the line of inquiry. The interested reader can find more insights into this criterion from recent 
convergence literature (Asongu 2014b, Asongu and Nwachukwu 2016b).   
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noted that the order of increasing magnitude is broadly consistent with the findings in Table 4. 
Third, in line with Table 4, the effect of aid on fuels exports is consistently not positively 
significant. Fourth, the interactions between terrorism and multilateral aid display negative 
marginal effects on fuel exports. In addition, the modifying thresholds for which the effect 
becomes negative are within the range (-1.249 to 7.105) of multilateral aid disclosed in the 
summary statistics, notably: 2.000 (0.002/0.001) for domestic terrorism; 2.750 (0.011/0.004) 
for transnational terrorism and 1.111 (0.001/0.0009) for total terrorism.  While the interaction 
of multilateral aid with unclear terrorism is significant, we do not provide the corresponding 
modifying thresholds because the underlying incidence of unclear terrorism on the export of 
fuel is insignificant. Fifth, in accordance with Table 4, there is evidence of convergence in 
fuel exports. Sixth, most of the significant control variables display the expected signs: (i) the 
positive sign of internal/civil conflicts is consistent with those of terrorism dynamics and (ii) 
political globalisation positively influences resources exports (Rudra and Jensen 2011).  
In Table 6, the following findings are apparent. First, in line with Tables 4-5, the 
information criteria for the validity of models do not consistently hold across specifications on 
the RHS. Second, with the exception of transnational terrorism, the effect of terrorism on the 
dependent variable on the LHS is positive, with the following order of increasing relevance in 
magnitude: total terrorism (0.007), domestic terrorism (0.008) and unclear terrorism (0.048). 
It should be noted that, the order of increasing magnitude is broadly consistent with those 
established in Tables 4-5. Third, consistent with Tables 4-5, the impact of total aid on fuel 
exports is consistently not positively significant. Fourth, the interactions between terrorism 
and total aid reveal negative marginal effects on fuel exports. Moreover, the modifying 
thresholds for which the effects become negative are within the acceptable range of total aid 
(i.e. 0.800 to 8.495) disclosed in the summary statistics, notably: 8.000 (0.008/0.001) for 
domestic terrorism; 6.000 (0.048/0.008) for unclear terrorism and 7.000 (0.007/0.001) for 
total terrorism.  Fifth, consistent with Tables 4-5, there is evidence of convergence in fuel 
exports. Sixth, most of the significant control variables display the expected signs. Moreover, 
further to the signs of internal conflicts and political globalisation already discussed, the sign 
of inflation is negative as expected.  
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Table 4: Resources, Bilateral aid and Terrorism  
         
 Fuel Export (ln) Iron Ore Export (ln) 
 
Domter Tranater Unclter Totter Domter Tranater Unclter Totter 
Constant -2.026 -4.171 -5.857 -2.631 -2.754 -2.048 -3.759 -3.381* 
 (0.581) (0.246) (0.158) (0.471) (0.178) (0.334) (0.110) (0.098) 
Fuel (ln) (-1) 0.794*** 0.797*** 0.755*** 0.790*** --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
Ore & Iron (ln)(-1) --- --- --- --- 0.926*** 0.840*** 0.935*** 0.931*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Domestic T. (Domter) 0.007** --- --- --- -0.003* --- --- --- 
 (0.015)    (0.060)    
Transnational T. (Tranater) --- 0.041* --- --- --- -0.030 --- --- 
  (0.072)    (0.196)   
Unclear T. (Unclter) --- --- 0.042** --- --- --- -0.016 --- 
   (0.026)    (0.564)  
Total T. (Totter) --- --- --- 0.006*** --- --- --- -0.001 
    (0.009)    (0.221) 
Bilateral Aid (LnBilaid) 0.022 0.030 0.071 0.033 -0.031 -0.030 -0.003 -0.017 
 (0.783) (0.678) (0.372) (0.678) (0.471) (0.407) (0.935) (0.648) 
Domter ×  LnBilaid -0.001*** --- --- --- 0.0003 --- --- --- 
 (0.005)    (0.199)    
Tranater ×  LnBilaid --- -0.007* --- --- --- 0.004 --- --- 
  (0.074)    (0.257)   
Unclter ×  LnBilaid --- --- -0.008*** --- --- --- 0.001 --- 
   (0.007)    (0.771)  
Totter ×  LnBilaid --- --- --- -0.001*** --- --- --- 0.0001 
    (0.003)    (0.513) 
LnTrade 0.198 0.299 0.481 0.277 -0.043 -0.235 0.015 -0.031 
 (0.604) (0.384) (0.215) (0.458) (0.804) (0.151) (0.932) (0.851) 
LnInflation -0.106 -0.088 -0.086 -0.107 -0.0003 -0.025 -0.012 -0.004 
 (0.131) (0.128) (0.145) (0.116) (0.992) (0.435) (0.719) (0.985) 
LnInfrastructure  0.074 0.122 0.149 0.075 -0.069 -0.074 -0.044 -0.060 
 (0.479) (0.274) (0.180) (0.475) (0.106) (0.189) (0.373) (0.164) 
LnXrate (Exchange rate) -0.076* -0.043 -0.056 -0.069 -0.0006 0.001 -0.007 -0.0007 
 (0.093) (0.272) (0.159) (0.124) (0.979) (0.950) (0.669) (0.987) 
Ln (Political globalisation)  0.432 0.767 0.935 0.475 0.884** 0.919** 1.000** 0.886** 
 (0.435) (0.201) (0.171) (0.394) (0.030) (0.039) (0.041) (0.030) 
Civil Conflicts  0.038 0.065 0.030 0.035 -0.001 0.022 -0.005 0.0007 
 (0.304) (0.106) (0.498) (0.374) (0.930) (0.409) (0.822) (0.975) 
         
Net Effects  0.0018 0.0047 0.0005 0.0008 nsa nsa nsa nsa 
         
AR(1) (0.031) (0.032) (0.038) (0.031) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
AR(2) (0.757) (0.744) (0.846) (0.773) (0.090) (0.098) (0.087) (0.089) 
Sargan OIR (0.044) (0.035) (0.064) (0.043) (0.092) (0.011) (0.065) (0.066) 
Hansen OIR (0.170) (0.274) (0.406) (0.178) (0.432) (0.161) (0.286) (0.398) 
         
DHT for instruments         
(a)Instruments in levels         
H excluding group (0.444) (0.511) (0.736) (0.464) (0.786) (0.818) (0.648) (0.757) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.128) (0.205) (0.234) (0.130) (0.233) (0.050) (0.167) (0.218) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))         
H excluding group (0.459) (0.442) (0.587) (0.421) (0.270) (0.204) (0.143) (0.265) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.043) (0.138) (0.163) (0.061) (0.804) (0.229) (0.852) (0.732) 
         
Fisher  70.15*** 76.81*** 61.58*** 66.19*** 234.55*** 83.80*** 231.30*** 185.51*** 
Instruments  45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 
Countries  73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 
Observations  376 376 376 376 381 381 381 381 
 
        
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Totaid: Total aid.  DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of 
Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The 
significance of estimated coefficients, Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no 
autocorrelation in the AR (1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests. The mean value of 
bilateral aid is 5.181. nsa: not specifically applicable because the model is invalid.  
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Table 5: Resources, Multilateral aid and Terrorism  
         
 Fuel Export (ln) Iron Ore Export (ln) 
 
Domter Tranater Unclter Totter Domter Tranater Unclter Totter 
Constant -4.382 -4.097 -6.280** -4.711 -3.488* 4.730** -3.200* -3.162* 
 (0.188) (0.169) (0.037) (0.107) (0.070) (0.041) (0.091) (0.069) 
Fuel (ln) (-1) 0.840*** 0.810*** 0.828*** 0.836*** --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
Ore & Iron (ln)(-1) --- --- --- --- 0.955*** 0.894*** 0.975*** 0.957*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Domestic T. (Domter) 0.002** --- --- --- -0.0003 --- --- --- 
 (0.022)    (0.694)    
Transnational T. (Tranater) --- 0.011* --- --- --- -0.016*** --- --- 
  (0.055)    (0.000)   
Unclear T. (Unclter) --- --- 0.009 --- --- --- -0.011 --- 
   (0.243)    (0.144)  
Total T. (Totter) --- --- --- 0.001** --- --- --- -0.0004 
    (0.012)    (0.560) 
Multilateral Aid (LnMulaid) 0.032 0.046 0.019 0.039 -0.016 -0.067 -0.021 -0.024 
 (0.587) (0.515) (0.748) (0.506) (0.737) (0.247) (0.651) (0.631) 
Domter ×  LnMulaid -0.001*** --- --- --- -0.00003 --- --- --- 
 (0.000)    (0.842)    
Tranater ×  LnMulaid --- -0.004*** --- --- --- 0.002* --- --- 
  (0.006)    (0.097)   
Unclter ×  LnMulaid --- --- -0.003*** --- --- --- 0.0004 --- 
   (0.000)    (0.683)  
Totter ×  LnMulaid --- --- --- -0.0009*** --- --- --- -0.00002 
    (0.000)    (0.844) 
LnTrade 0.019 -0.019 0.127 0.032 0.054 -0.123 -0.040 0.042 
 (0.398) (0.936) (0.611) (0.895) (0.753) (0.493) (0.802) (0.805) 
LnInflation -0.076 -0.080 -0.059 -0.068 -0.022 -0.050 -0.016 -0.021 
 (0.162) (0.116) (0.186) (0.197) (0.501) (0.137) (0.551) (0.532) 
LnInfrastructure  0.049 0.089 0.041 0.047 -0.075 -0.041 -0.016 -0.074 
 (0.569) (0.355) (0.642) (0.582) (0.200) (0.594) (0.767) (0.220) 
LnXrate (Exchange rate) -0.074* -0.059 -0.031 -0.064 -0.019 -0.028 -0.015 -0.017 
 (0.065) (0.113) (0.455) (0.101) (0.510) (0.328) (0.463) (0.546) 
Ln (Political globalisation)  1.137* 1.107* 1.440*** 1.156** 0.938** 1.478*** 0.943** 0.884** 
 (0.060) (0.061) (0.006) (0.048) (0.016) (0.002) (0.035) (0.020) 
Civil Conflicts  0.065* 0.037   0.057 0.068* -0.027 0.029 0.006 -0.019 
 (0.070) (0.247) (0.130) (0.053) (0.358) (0.376) (0.799) (0.526) 
 
 
  
 
    
Net Effects  -0.0021 -0.0056 na -0.0027 nsa nsa nsa nsa 
         
AR(1) (0.033) (0.030) (0.036) (0.034) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) 
AR(2) (0.619) (0.621) (0.636) (0.625) (0.080) (0.084) (0.074) (0.080) 
Sargan OIR (0.101) (0.074) (0.143) (0.100) (0.199) (0.129) (0.188) (0.182) 
Hansen OIR (0.209) (0.367) (0.412) (0.238) (0.420) (0.609) (0.520) (0.427) 
         
DHT for instruments         
(a)Instruments in levels         
H excluding group (0.359) (0.383) (0.670) (0.357) (0.580) (0.592) (0.625) (0.453) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.202) (0.376) (0.268) (0.237) (0.320) (0.529) (0.403) (0.402) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))         
H excluding group (0.260) (0.328) (0.242) (0.235) (0.233) (0.423) (0.466) (0.231) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.242) (0.477) (0.836) (0.365) (0.877) (0.844) (0.534) (0.899) 
         
Fisher  62.00*** 63.44*** 81.33*** 61.60*** 317.18*** 73.13*** 153.74*** 300.65*** 
Instruments  45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 
Countries  73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 
Observations  374 374 374 374 379 379 379 379 
 
        
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Totaid: Total aid.  DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of 
Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The 
significance of estimated coefficients, Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no 
autocorrelation in the AR (1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests. The mean value of 
multilateral aid is 4.163. nsa: not specifically applicable because the model is invalid. na: not applicable because at least one estimated 
coefficient needed for the computation of net effects is not significant.  
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Table 6: Resources, Total  aid and Terrorism  
         
 Fuel Export (ln) Iron Ore Export (ln) 
 
Domter Tranater Unclter Totter Domter Tranater Unclter Totter 
Constant -5.506 -6.177 -7.991* -5.539 -3.552 -4.148* -4.586* -3.765* 
 (0.221) (0.110) (0.073) (0.212) (0.137) (0.059) (0.053) (0.089) 
Fuel (ln) (-1) 0.793*** 0.780*** 0.761*** 0.788*** --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
Ore & Iron (ln)(-1) --- --- --- --- 0.909*** 0.836*** 0.931*** 0.916*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Domestic T. (Domter) 0.008*** --- --- --- -0.001 --- --- --- 
 (0.009)    (0.398)    
Transnational T. (Tranater) --- 0.029 --- --- --- -0.050** --- --- 
  (0.205)    (0.030)   
Unclear T. (Unclter) --- --- 0.048** --- --- --- -0.010 --- 
   (0.019)    (0.703)  
Total T. (Totter) --- --- --- 0.007*** --- --- --- -0.001 
    (0.002)    (0.597) 
Total Aid (LnTotaid) 0.019 0.009 0.023 0.028 -0.039 -0.069 0.011 -0.029 
 (0.842) (0.922) (0.777) (0.772) (0.460) (0.247) (0.817) (0.558) 
Domter ×  LnTotaid -0.001*** --- --- --- 0.0001 --- --- --- 
 (0.002)    (0.645)    
Tranater ×  LnTotaid --- -0.005 --- --- --- 0.007* --- --- 
  (0.189)    (0.053)   
Unclter ×  LnTotaid --- --- -0.008*** --- --- --- 0.000 --- 
   (0.002)    (0.929)  
Totter ×  LnTotaid --- --- --- -0.001*** --- --- --- 0.00004 
    (0.001)    (0.887) 
LnTrade 0.234 0.125 0.378 0.265 -0.065 -0.230 0.061 -0.040 
 (0.568) (0.734) (0.358) (0.502) (0.697) (0.176) (0.722) (0.803) 
LnInflation -0.130* -0.102 -0.082 -0.133* -0.004 -0.022 -0.004 -0.006 
 (0.063) (0.112) (0.202) (0.055) (0.889) (0.480) (0.883) (0.849) 
LnInfrastructure  0.038 0.088 0.057 0.035 -0.071* -0.064 -0.040 -0.065 
 (0.761) (0.506) (0.628) (0.779) (0.099) (0.302) (0.413) (0.131) 
LnXrate (Exchange rate) -0.102** -0.076* -0.081* -0.101** 0.004 0.017 -0.001 0.004 
 (0.034) (0.094) (0.076) (0.035) (0.858) (0.543) (0.935) (0.869) 
Ln (Political globalisation)  1.253* 1.550** 1.683** 1.222* 1.093** 1.372*** 1.119** 1.131** 
 (0.081) (0.017) (0.022) (0.089) (0.016) (0.004) (0.028) (0.016) 
Civil Conflicts  0.046 0.086** 0.040 0.040 0.002 0.028 -0.007 0.005 
 (0.290) (0.043) (0.313) (0.389) (0.926) (0.274) (0.732) (0.835) 
  
 
      
Net Effects  0.0024 na 0.0036 0.0014 nsa nsa nsa nsa 
         
AR(1) (0.032) (0.033) (0.040) (0.032) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
AR(2) (0.741) (0.724) (0.818) (0.763) (0.081) (0.084) (0.072) (0.079) 
Sargan OIR (0.053) (0.040) (0.082) (0.055) (0.103) (0.016) (0.084) (0.073) 
Hansen OIR (0.228) (0.335) (0.528) (0.236) (0.433) (0.245) (0.295) (0.396) 
         
DHT for instruments         
(a)Instruments in levels         
H excluding group (0.543) (0.460) (0.734) (0.055) (0.699) (0.734) (0.696) (0.591) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.153) (0.292) (0.350) (0.236) (0.275) (0.112) (0.158) (0.290) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))         
H excluding group (0.561) (0.400) (0.586) (0.548) (0.256) (0.304) (0.192) (0.269) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.045) (0.272) (0.334) (0.156) (0.819) (0.246) (0.679) (0.713) 
         
Fisher  65.22*** 68.66*** 70.04*** 62.58*** 153.79*** 97.06*** 271.05*** 126.57*** 
Instruments  45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 
Countries  73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 
Observations  380 380 380 380 385 385 385 385 
 
        
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Totaid: Total aid.  DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of 
Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The 
significance of estimated coefficients, Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no 
autocorrelation in the AR (1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests. The mean value of 
total aid is 5.550. nsa: not specifically applicable because the model is invalid. na: not applicable because at least one estimated coefficient 
needed for the computation of net effects is not significant.  
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3.2 Further discussion on conditional and unconditional effects  
 The first bone of contention in relation to the underpinning literature is the unexpected 
findings that terrorism increases resource exports. Accordingly, this positive unconditional 
relationship runs counter to the engaged studies, namely: the underpinnings of De Sousa et al. 
(2009a, 2019b), Richardson (2004) on security measures following the 9/11 terrorists’ blow 
on the United States and Nitsch and Schumacher (2004) on a negative terrorism-trade nexus. 
In our view, these unanticipated signs could be traceable to at least four factors.  
(1) The fact that the sampled periodicity reflects an era during which terrorist activities 
have been relatively less pronounced compared to more contemporary evidence. Accordingly, 
whereas the choice of the periodicity (1984-2008) used in this study has been amply justified 
in the introduction, it is worthwhile noting that according to the Global Terrorism Index (GTI, 
2014, p. 13) terrorists activities and their corresponding negative externalities on developing 
countries have been relatively more substantial in the post -2011 Arab Spring era.   
(2) Another very likely explanation eliciting the positive nexus between terrorism and 
fuel exports could be the weight of more advanced developing countries in the underlying 
relationship. Accordingly, relatively more advanced-developing oil-rich countries may be 
endowed with better logistical and financial capacities for absorbing the negative externalities 
of terrorist activities on fuel exports. This interpretation is in line with justifications of 
Asongu and Kodila-Tedika (2017a) on the narrative from Gaibulloev and Sandler (2009) 
which has been verified in an evolving body of literature, namely: Öcal and Yildirim  (2010) 
and Meierrieks and Gries (2013).   
 (3) Developing countries confronted with terrorism activities may be motivated to 
enhance export volumes in a bid to increase the incremental government budget needed to 
combat underlying terrorists’ activities. This explanation is based on the fact that countries in 
the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) produce far lower than their 
full capacities (Gault et al. 1999).   
 (4) Terrorists incidents in some countries may increase an investment appetite in the 
exploration, exploitation and ultimately, the exportation of fuel. The premise for this intuition 
is that the intention of some investors to engage with the fuel industry of countries associated 
with terrorism may be more than proportionate to terrorist activities if expected returns 
outweigh underlying risks. Contemporary examples include: (i) increasing investment from 
China in Nigeria’s Delta region despite growing threats from the Movement for the 
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) (Obi, 2008) and (ii) China is still present in South 
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Sudan in spite of all security risks because South Sudan represents about 5% of crude oil 
imports by China (Aguirre, 2014). This justification is consistent with the attendant literature 
on China’s oil diplomacy and a long term economic strategy of engaging countries with 
outlooks of political instability and/or strife (Elu and Price 2010, Asongu and Aminkeng 
2013). As a policy implication, blanket policies aimed at employing development assistance 
to hedge to  the potentially unfavourable impact of terrorism on fuel exports should be 
cautiously taken unless a prior negative terrorism-‘fuel export’ nexus is established.  
 Another unexpected finding we have established is the negative incidence pertaining 
to the interaction between foreign aid and fuel exports. One likely explanation for this 
unexpected negative marginal effect could be drawn from the political economy of 
development assistance. Accordingly, foreign aid devoted to fighting a hypothetical negative 
effect from a scourge may eventually yield the opposite effect. In essence, if the underlying 
incidence of terrorism on fuel exports is not first grasped by foreign policy, unexpected results 
should be expected, especially given the recent literature supporting the negative role of 
foreign aid on political instability and violence (Eubank 2012, Asongu 2015b).  The 
corresponding implication for policy is that, it is recommendable for policy to first of all 
empirically establish how and by what degree terrorism negatively influences fuel exports 
prior to adopting development assistance to hedge against the corresponding negative impact 
that in effect, may not be apparent in the first place.   
 Consistent with the justifications provided to substantiate the geographical and 
temporal scopes discussed in the introduction, it is worthwhile to also engage how the 
findings established in this study complement existing literature that has also been based on 
the same periodicity and sample. It is worthwhile to articulate that while Bandyopadhyay et 
al. (2014) have focused on the incidence of development assistance in reducing the 
unfavourable effect of terrorism on  FDI, Efobi et al. (2018) and Asongu et al. (2015) have 
extended the baseline paper by respectively conditioning the nexus on corruption-control 
levels and existing FDI levels. Furthermore, the last-two research papers which have 
respectively used a more robust version of the GMM technique and quantile regressions 
departs from  Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014) in the light of the exclusive negative (positive) 
terrorism-FDI (incidence on FDI resulting from the moderating role of foreign aid on 
terrorism).  This research has extended the stream of literature by: (i) using resource (fuel and 
iron ore) exports as the outcome indicators; (ii) failing to confirm the results from 
Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014) within perspectives of incidences of  terrorism, foreign aid and 
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their corresponding interactive impacts on macroeconomic outcomes and (iii) only partially 
validating the findings of Efobi et al. (2018) and Asongu et al. (2015) in terms of the positive 
effect of terrorism and the negative effect of interactions. It should be noted that, while we 
have consistently established positive and negative effects from terrorism and ‘interaction 
between terrorism and aid dynamics’ respectively, the findings of Asongu et al. (2015) and 
Efobi et al. (2018) are consistent with our findings only with respect to certain specifications.   
 
3.3 Extended analysis with net effects 
Given the unexpected results, an extended analysis is performed in which net effects are 
computed.  In accordance with recent literature on interactive regressions (Asongu and 
Odhiambo 2019a, 2019b, Agoba et al., 2019), these net effects are constitutive of the 
unconditional effect from terrorism and the conditional impacts from the interaction between 
foreign aid and terrorism dynamics. Based on the extended analysis, bilateral aid and total aid 
modulate terrorism dynamics to induce net positive effects on fuel exports while multilateral 
aid moderates terrorism dynamics to engender negative net effects on fuel exports. 
For example, in the second column of  Table 1, the net effects from the role of 
bilateral aid in modulating the incidence of domestic terrorism on fuel exports is 0.0018 ([-
0.001× 5.181] + [0.007]). In the calculation, 5.181 is the average value of bilateral aid, -0.001 
is the unconditional effect of domestic terrorism while 0.007 is the conditional effect 
pertaining to the interaction between bilateral aid and domestic terrorism.  
 
4.  Concluding implications and further research directions  
 The motivation for this paper has been to assess the role of foreign aid in mitigating 
the documented negative evidence of terrorism on resource exports. We have built on 
evidence from the literature sustaining that terrorism is detrimental for trade exports to 
complement recent research on the relationship between terrorism proxies and 
macroeconomic indicators. In summary, the following findings have been established. First, 
in the light of the information criteria used to assess the validity of specifications, estimations 
pertaining to  iron ore exports are not valid. Second, there is evidence of convergence in fuel 
exports. Third, while the unconditional effects of aid dynamics are not significant, the 
unconditional impacts of terrorism dynamics are consistently positive on fuel exports. Fourth, 
the interaction between terrorism and aid dynamics consistently display negative signs, with 
corresponding modifying aid thresholds within respective ranges. 
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 Given the unexpected results, an extended analysis is performed in which net effects 
are computed. These net effects are constitutive of the unconditional effect from terrorism and 
the conditional impacts from the interaction between foreign aid and terrorism dynamics. 
Based on the extended analysis, bilateral aid and total aid modulate terrorism dynamics to 
induce net positive effects on fuel exports while multilateral aid moderates terrorism 
dynamics to engender negative net effects on fuel exports.  
 Convergence in fuel exports implies that countries with low-levels in fuel exports are 
catching-up their counterparts with higher levels. This implies the feasibility of common 
policies (by fuel-exporting countries) within a framework that would be determined by the 
timeline to full catch-up. Accordingly, with full catch-up, common or adopted policies can be 
implemented (by fuel-exporting countries) without distinction of nationality.  
In the light of established findings and corresponding policy implications, there is 
evidently room for future research in: (i) understanding mechanisms by which terrorism 
positively affects fuel exports, (ii) using a periodicity that articulates a post-2011 Arab Spring 
tendency and (iii) considering initial fuel export levels in the modelling exercise.  
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